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Abstract 
 
Differences in diesel fuel prices can significantly distort competition both between and within domestic 
road haulage markets. This is well illustrated by the case of the UK, where diesel fuel prices are by far the 
highest in the EU. The paper examines the effects of high and rising fuel prices on cabotage penetration in 
the UK road freight market and reviews a series of measures that have been proposed to ‘level the playing 
field’ between British and foreign hauliers. Within domestic haulage markets, carriers also vary in the 
extent to which they can recover fuel price increases from shippers. The paper reviews recent empirical 
evidence on this subject collected in the UK and outlines several methods of compensating hauliers for 
fuel price rises. 
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Introduction 
 
Within the European Union, fuel typically accounts for between a quarter and a third 
of the total costs of operating a truck. This makes economic conditions in the road 
haulage industry highly sensitive to the prevailing price of fuel, particularly during 
periods of rising fuel prices. If changes in fuel prices and the structure of vehicle 
operating costs were uniform across the continent, cross-border competition in the 
European road haulage industry would be largely unaffected by fuel price inflation. In 
reality, however, fuel prices have increased at varying rates in both absolute terms and 
relative to other haulage costs. Fuel price rises have also had a differential impact within 
national haulage markets, partly because of differences in the nature of distribution 
operations and vehicles used, but also because some hauliers are better able than others 
to recover fuel price increases from their clients. 
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Increases in fuel prices have therefore had the effect of distorting the market for road 
haulage services both internationally and within individual countries. One country in 
which these distortions have been pronounced is the UK. For over twenty years, it has 
had both the highest fuel prices in Europe and the most liberal market for road haulage 
services. Its island status and relatively peripheral location within Europe has offered its 
domestic hauliers some protection from international competition, though in recent 
years foreign penetration of the British haulage market has sharply increased (Sciullo 
and Smihily, 2006). It is frequently argued, mainly by trade associations, that this influx 
of foreign hauliers is a direct consequence of Britain’s high fuel duty policy. In the first 
part of this paper, we examine this proposition using data drawn from several sources. 
We also consider what can be done at both EU and national levels to moderate the 
effects of fuel price differences on cross-border competition in the road haulage 
industry. 
The second part of the paper explores differences in the ability of trucking companies 
to recover fuel price increases from shippers and outlines several procedures that can be 
adopted to compensate carriers for fuel price rises over which they have no control. 
 
International divergence of fuel duties and prices 
In 1993 the duty on diesel fuel in the UK was 23% above the EU average. By 1999 it 
was 96% above this average (Road Haulage Association, 2000). The reason for this 
sharp divergence was the introduction by the British government in 1994 of a ‘fuel duty 
escalator’ policy. This policy, which was unique within Europe, was justified on the 
grounds that it would help Britain to meet its Kyoto target for CO2 emissions. It initially 
increased fuel duty in real terms by 5% per annum and after 1997 by 6% per annum. 
The impact of this measure on haulage costs was mitigated in the early years by a 
decline in world oil prices. By 1998, however, an upward trend in oil prices coupled 
with the raising of the annual tax increment from 5 to 6% amplified its effect. Between 
May 1997 and September 2000, the diesel fuel price rose by around 30%, increasing 
fuel's share of the typical haulier's budget from a quarter to a third (McKinnon, 2001). 
The government abandoned the fuel duty escalator policy in 19991, the year before the 
‘fuel crisis’ when road hauliers and farmers blockaded oil refineries and obstructed 
major roads in protest against high fuel prices (Lyons and Chatterjee, 2002). 
Since 2000, the diesel fuel duty in the UK has declined slightly in real terms 
(Leicester, 2005), though still remains much higher than the levels in other EU member 
states (Figure 1) (European Commission, 2006a). At 0.89 Euro per litre, it is 75% higher 
than the EU average and 141% higher than in Latvia, the mainland EU member state 
that taxes fuel the least. The fact that the diesel fuel price is higher in the UK than any 
other EU country is entirely due to the higher level of duty and tax that the government 
imposes. In March 2006, the UK actually had the lowest pre-tax fuel price in the EU 
                                                 
1 Although originally justified as an environmental measure the high fuel duty policy was latterly 
defended on the grounds that it provided additional public funds for schools and hospitals. The 
connection between high fuel prices and climate change therefore weakened. Britain is, nevertheless, in 
line to meet its Kyoto targets, mainly as a result of a large shift in electricity generation from coal to gas. 
It is difficult to measure the contribution that the fuel duty escalator made to the pursuit of the Kyoto 
targets. As discussed later in the paper, fuel efficiency in the road freight sector rose by a significant 
margin between 1994 and 1999, while the escalator policy was in force. 
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(Figure 1). At 0.48 Euro per litre, it was 6% below the EU25 average and 15% below 
the equivalent price in Italy of 0.56 Euro per litre.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: International Variations in Diesel Fuel Prices, Duty and Taxes: March 2006. 
Source: European Commission (2006). 
 
Although there is currently a substantial difference in the diesel fuel price between the 
UK and other EU member states, it used to be much wider. In September 2000, at the 
time of the fuel protests, diesel fuel in the UK cost roughly 50% more than the EU 
average (the EU15 at that time) (McKinnon, 2001). By March 2006, the differential had 
narrowed to 24% (Figure 2). The gap in average fuel prices between the UK and its near 
neighbours in France, Belgium and the Netherlands also narrowed from 52% to 28% 
over this period (European Commission, 2006a). This recent trend has taken the gap in 
diesel fuel prices between the UK and the EU15 back to the level it was at in 1993, the 
year prior to the introduction of the UK government’s fuel duty escalator policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Narrowing of UK –EU Differential in Diesel Fuel Prices: 2000-2006 
Source: European Commission (2006). 
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The difference in fuel prices between the UK and the rest of the EU has shrunk 
because increases in diesel fuel prices over the past six years have been mainly 
attributable to increases in the pre-tax price of fuel. As the main inflationary pressure 
has been exerted by the world price of oil, those countries with relatively low rates of 
fuel duty have experienced the largest increase in pump prices. Between January 2004 
and March 2006, a period over which the market price of oil doubled from $34 to 
almost $70 a barrel, the average diesel price rose by 49% in Greece as opposed to 23% 
in the UK (Figure 3). Because of the buffering effect of high fuel duties, the UK 
experienced the lowest percentage increase in fuel prices over this period, significantly 
below the average 36% increase across the EU15. One of the few consolations of 
having fuel duty set at a relatively high level is that it reduces the sensitivity of pump 
prices to variations in the market price of oil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: % Increase in Diesel Fuel Prices between Jan 2004 and March 2006 
Source: European Commission (2006). 
 
 
Foreign penetration of the UK road haulage market 
 
Prior to 1991, foreign-registered hauliers were prohibited from undertaking domestic 
haulage work in any EU country. This practice, known as ‘cabotage’, was legalized 
during the 1990s. Increasing numbers of cabotage permits were issued each year until 
1998 when cabotage was fully liberalized. Prior to the liberalisation of cabotage during 
the 1990s, the differences in fuel duty between the UK and other EU member states 
irritated British hauliers but had little direct effect on the domestic road haulage market. 
Since the complete liberalisation of cabotage in 1998, there has been a sharp increase in 
the amount of domestic haulage work undertaken in the UK by foreign carriers.The 
extent of this increase is uncertain, however, because of disparities between the two sets 
of cabotage statistics available. The level of cabotage in a country is measured by the 
‘cabotage penetration rate’. This is defined as ‘the proportion of a country’s domestic 
market (national transport plus cabotage) taken by cabotage’ (Schiullo and Smihily, 
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2005). Table 1 shows the cabotage penetration rates estimated by Eurostat and the UK 
government between 1997 and 2004 using different survey methodologies. The latter 
estimates are substantially lower, but still show a steep increase in cabotage between 
2000 and 2003. The Eurostat figures are based on a larger sample of operators and more 
consistent sampling frame. On the basis of these figures, it is estimated that the amount 
of freight movement on cabotage journeys within the UK increased from 79 million 
tonne-kms in 1997, the year preceding full liberalization of cabotage, to 1.86 billion 
tonne-kms in 2004. 
 
Table 1. Estimates of road cabotage penetration rates for the UK: % of domestic road tonne-kms. 
 
 Eurostat UK government 
1997 0.05 - 
1999 0.48 - 
2000 0.87 0.06 
2001 0.86 - 
2002 0.96 - 
2003 1.05 0.4 
2004 1.20 - 
  
Sources: Allen (2001), Oberhausen (2003), Sciullo and Smihily (2005), Sciullo and Smihily (2006), 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2000) and Department for Transport 
(2003a). 
 
Almost all of this freight movement will have been powered by fuel purchased 
outside the country. Foreign operators invariably fill their fuel tanks before entering the 
UK. This gives them a significant cost advantage over UK-registered hauliers. In March 
2006, diesel fuel could be purchased, respectively, 20% and 24% cheaper in France and 
Belgium than in the UK (European Commission, 2006a). Other things being equal, this 
would have given the typical French or Belgium haulier a 5-6% cost advantage over 
their British counterpart. On a full tank of fuel, typically holding 1500 litres in the case 
of a 40 tonne articulated lorry, they could exploit this advantage over a distance of 
around 3000 kms. As the average length of haul for UK domestic freight movements by 
articulated trucks with gross weights in excess of 33 tonnes is only 125 kms, a 
substantial number of cabotage journeys can be undertaken on a single tank of cheaper 
fuel purchased outside the UK. 
There is some disagreement over the resulting distortion of the UK domestic road 
haulage market. The Eurostat estimate of the level of cabotage in the UK in 2004 
suggests that only around 1.2% of domestic road tonne-kms were carried in foreign-
registered vehicles (in line with the EU average) (Sciullo and Smihily, 2006). This 
figure expresses cabotage penetration as a percentage of total road tonne-kms in lorries 
with a gross weight of over 3.5 tonnes. This definition includes local deliveries by 
smaller rigid vehicles, a market in which foreign carriers seldom compete. As the vast 
majority of foreign trucks are articulated vehicles with a gross weight of 40 tonnes, it is 
more realistic to measure cabotage with respect to this heavier end of the haulage 
market. Confining the measure to tonne-kms carried in articulated vehicles with gross 
weights of 33 tonnes or more, increases the cabotage penetration rate by just under 50%, 
but this still represented only around 1.7% of domestic tonne-kms in 2004. The main 
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trade associations argue that the relevant haulage market should be more tightly defined 
in terms of vehicle type, length of haul and geographical area. The Road Haulage 
Association, for example, claims that cabotage penetration of the general haulage sector 
comprising 75,000 trucks of 38 tonnes or more ‘could be as high as 25 per cent’ (Local 
Government and Transport Committee, 2006). Such a high level of penetration is only 
likely to occur in particular geographical areas or routes. 
By combining data from the Foreign Vehicle Survey (FVS) and the Continuing 
Survey Road Goods Transport (CSRGT) for 2003 it is possible to conduct a 
geographical analysis of foreign penetration of the British road haulage market 
(Department for Transport, 2003 and 2004a). The available data from the FVS 
combines cabotage journeys with the UK legs of cross-border trips and transit 
movements between Ireland and the European mainland. It is not possible, therefore, to 
calculate cabotage penetration rates on a geographically disaggregated basis. Tables 2 
and 3 measure the foreign penetration of inter-regional and intra-regional haulage 
markets expressed, respectively, in tonnes and tonne-kms2. They reveal wide 
geographical variations in the extent to which foreign operators have penetrated the UK 
haulage market. This market penetration is greatest on inter-regional routes to and from 
the South East of England and East England, regions in which the main roll-on roll-off 
ferry ports are located. Relatively high penetration rates were also recorded on routes to 
and from Wales through which most of the Irish transit traffic passes. Overall 6 (7%) of 
the inter-regional links had penetration rates between 5 and 9.9%, 8 (9%) between 10 
and 19.9% and 7 (8%) over 20%. This suggests that foreign competition is having a 
significant impact on the road haulage market in particular parts of the country. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Road Tonnes-lifted Carried by Foreign-Registered Hauliers on Intra- and Inter-
regional Routes in the UK. 
 North 
East 
North 
West 
Yorks/ 
Humb 
East 
Midlands 
West 
Midlands 
East of 
England 
South 
East 
South 
West 
Wales Scotland 
North 
East 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 9.1% 12.3% - - 0.9% 
North 
West 0.3% 0.2% 1.9% 0.9% 1.2% 4.1% 19.7% 2.8% 2.1% 0.7% 
Yorks 
Humber  0.9% 1.5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.5% 5.9% 16.0% 0.1% 3.6% 3.0% 
East 
Midlands 1.4% 1.0% 0.7% 0.1% 0.6% 1.8% 3.2% 0.1% 4.5% 0.7% 
West 
Midlands 0.6% 2.9% 2.5% 1.4% 0.2% 3.4% 9.6% 0.9% 3.4% 0.7% 
East of 
England 6.3% 2.5% 2.7% 3.1% 4.1% 1.0% 2.6% 1.5% 7.1% 4.2% 
South 
East 17.4% 33.6% 30.9% 16.5% 25.9% 11.9% 3.7% 7.2% 44.2% 21.7% 
South 
West - 0.6% 0.3% 0.3% 2.4% 1.9% 3.0% 0.2% 1.2% - 
Wales - 1.4% 9.0% 4.4% 2.5% 5.9% 25.1% 0.2% 0.1% - 
Scotland 0.4% 1.5% 2.9% 0.0% 2.2% - 38.6% - - 0.1% 
Source: Department for Transport (2003 and 2004). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The Burns Inquiry, commissioned by the two main trade bodies (FTA and RHA), conducted a similar 
analysis using the same data to assess ‘foreign vehicle activity as a % of goods moved by road in Great 
Britain’. It is not clear what unit of measurement was used for vehicle activity. Although the results are 
broadly similar to those in Tables 2 and 3, there are significant disparities. 
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Table3: Percentage of Road Tonnes-kms Carried by Foreign-Registered Hauliers on Intra- and Inter-
regional Routes in the UK 
 
 North 
East 
North 
West 
Yorks/ 
Humber 
East 
Midlands 
West 
Midlands 
East of 
England 
South 
East 
South 
West 
Wales Scotland 
North 
East 0.0% 0.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.6% 10.2% 21.6% 0.0% 6.8% 1.0% 
North 
West 0.3% 0.4% 2.3% 0.8% 1.6% 5.7% 25.6% 2.7% 2.6% 1.0% 
Yorks 
Humber  1.4% 2.6% 0.5% 0.2% 0.6% 8.2% 20.9% 0.1% 4.2% 4.2% 
East 
Midlands 1.7% 1.3% 0.9% 0.2% 0.9% 3.5% 5.9% 0.0% 6.9% 0.8% 
West 
Midlands 0.9% 3.2% 3.5% 1.5% 0.2% 4.5% 16.7% 1.6% 6.8% 0.7% 
East of 
England 10.9% 3.3% 4.4% 5.0% 6.0% 1.6% 5.9% 2.9% 17.1% 10.9% 
South 
East 33.7% 51.9% 46.0% 33.9% 46.3% 24.3% 10.6% 16.2% - 36.1% 
South 
West 0.0% 0.7% 0.2% 0.4% 4.1% 2.0% 6.2% 0.4% 3.6% 1.2% 
Wales 8.7% 2.3% 8.6% 7.6% 4.0% 13.6% 45.0% 0.5% 0.2% 2.4% 
Scotland 0.4% 2.2% 4.2% 0.0% 2.0% 4.5% 68.7% 0.4% 4.1% 0.4% 
Source: Department for Transport (2003 and 2004). 
 
Foreign hauliers not only exert market influence by capturing traffic from domestic 
operators. Their presence in the market can also depress haulage rates on particular 
routes, squeezing the profit margins of domestic hauliers. 26% of hauliers responding to 
a survey conducted by the Burns Inquiry (2005) partly attributed worsening ‘terms and 
conditions’ to the ‘effects of foreign competition’ though they tended to be ‘localised 
and sector-specific’ (p.34-5). The financial position of hauliers operating on routes and 
in areas most affected by foreign competition is, therefore, likely to have been adversely 
affected by the differential fuel costs of British and foreign operators. 
This is a problem largely confined to domestic carriers. International road hauliers are 
able to buy all or most of their fuel in other countries at the same prices as foreign 
carriers. An analysis commissioned by European Conference of Ministers of Transport 
(2000) revealed that, despite national differences in the taxes paid by hauliers (fuel duty, 
vehicle excise duty and road tolls) the total amount of tax paid on international journeys 
varied little between hauliers registered in different countries. 
While travelling in other countries, British hauliers can engage in cabotage 
operations, partly offsetting cabotage penetration in the UK domestic haulage market. 
British hauliers, however, accounted for only 1.4% of all road cabotage in the EU in 
2004. This compares with the 12.9% of total EU cabotage activity performed in the UK 
(Sciullo and Smihily, 2006). A country’s overall road cabotage position can be 
measured by expressing cabotage tonne-kms handled by its registered hauliers in other 
countries as a ratio of the total tonne-kms carried by foreign operators in its domestic 
market (Figure 4). In 2004, the UK’s position was the weakest in the EU with its 
hauliers carrying only 10.9 tonne-kms on a cabotage basis elsewhere for every 100 
tonne-kms of cabotage in its home market. 
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Figure 4: Ratio of External Cabotage by Country’s Hauliers to Internal Cabotage Undertaken by Foreign-
registered Hauliers within the Country (based on tonne-kms). 
Source: Sciullo and Smihily (2006). 
 
Reasons for the increase in foreign haulage activity in the UK 
 
The sharp increase in foreign haulage activity in the UK cannot be attributed solely to 
the difference in fuel duties between the UK and other EU member states. It is one of a 
number of factors that have promoted this trend. Two other factors are also likely to 
have been important: 
1. Growth of imports into the UK: The overall degree of import penetration into the 
UK has risen sharply since 1997. Companies exporting by road to the UK tend to use 
hauliers registered in their home countries to transport their goods. This partly explains 
the influx of foreign-registered trucks into the UK. This trend is reinforced by 
differences in freight rates. Over the past decade, imports of goods from other EU 
countries have increased much faster than exports (Figure 5). The traffic imbalance is 
reflected in freight rates charged for haulage movements to and from the UK. As the 
dominant flow is inbound and hauliers find it difficult to find return loads from the UK, 
rates for import consignments are significantly higher than those for exports. Foreign 
carriers that can charge relatively high tariffs on journeys into the UK can offer low 
backhaul rates on return journeys to the European mainland. British international 
hauliers find it very difficult to compete with these low outbound rates. This helps to 
explain why the proportion of British registered lorries travelling between the UK and 
mainland Europe has dropped sharply over the past decade (Figure 6) and why British 
hauliers account for such a small proportion of cabotage in other countries. 
Luxembourg  206 
Slovenia 66
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Figure 5: Value of UK Imports and Exports to / from the European Union. 
Source: Office of National Statistics (2006). 
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Figure 6: Numbers of British- and Foreign-registered Lorries Travelling between UK and Mainland 
Europe. 
Source: Department for Transport (2006a). 
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2. Widening international differences in other haulage costs: The Burns Inquiry 
compiled comparative data on the costs of operating a 40 tonne 5-axle truck in six 
European countries. This indicated that operating costs were, respectively, 4%, 8%, 
21%, 37% and 69% higher in the UK than in Germany, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Bulgaria (Figure 7). Differences in fuel prices accounted for, respectively, 
139%, 110%, 49%, 30% and 31% of the variations in total vehicle operating costs. In 
Germany and Belgium, lower fuel prices were more than offset by higher labour costs, 
while in the three Eastern European states, the cost differential with the UK was even 
greater for drivers than for fuel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Structure of Truck Operating Costs in Six European Countries: annual expenditure. 
Source: Burns Inquiry (2005). 
 
 
Foreign operators can substantially undercut the labour costs paid by British-
registered hauliers, particularly by employing Eastern European drivers. According to 
the Burns Inquiry, driver costs in Hungary and Bulgaria were, respectively, 45% and 
27% of those in the UK. As operators need only comply with minimum wage 
regulations in the country in which the driver is employed, foreign trucks can be driven 
on UK roads by drivers employed at these low wage rates. This labour cost advantage is 
reinforced by the failure of many foreign carriers to fully observe the Road Transport 
Directive while operating in the UK. This Directive restricts working hours in the road 
haulage industry (Department for Transport, 2005a). While operating in the UK, foreign 
drivers are covered by Britain’s RTD regulations. It is very difficult, however, for the 
UK enforcement authority, VOSA, to check compliance as company records relating to 
working time are held at the foreign operator’s base outside the UK. This situation is 
further aggravated by the fact that many of the EU member states in which foreign 
operators are based have so far failed to implement the RTD (Local Government and 
Transport Committee, 2006).  
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Wider economic issues 
 
In assessing the net effect of foreign penetration of the British road haulage market, it 
is necessary to look beyond the interests of the domestic haulage industry. Many users 
of freight transport services have benefited from the arrival of foreign carriers offering 
lower rates. They have either benefited directly by employing their services or indirectly 
from the downward pressure on the general level of rates exerted by greater foreign 
competition in the market. No attempt has yet been made to quantify these benefits to 
shippers. 
 In evidence to a Scottish Parliamentary inquiry into freight transport, the 
representative of the Freight Transport Association, which represents mainly users of 
transport, claimed that he ‘did not think that the vast majority of his members regard the 
arrival of foreign operators as a good thing. They would rather deal with domestic 
operators with which they can build up long-term relationships that are founded on trust 
between parties’. The final report by the Parliament’s Local Government and Transport 
Committee (2006), nevertheless, disputed this claim, arguing that: 
 
‘If Scottish businesses wish to remain loyal to the indigenous road haulage industry 
and cultivate longer term relationships with local hauliers they can do so. If this were 
the prevailing view across Scottish industry, very little use would be made of foreign 
operators and the issue of cabotage penetration would not arise. The fact that the 
Committee’s attention has been drawn to the issue and it has been highlighted as a 
problem, suggests that some Scottish firms aim to minimise their transport costs 
regardless of the haulier used. This is perfectly reasonable behaviour.’ 
The intensification of competition in the UK haulage market is likely to have had the 
effect of improving the efficiency of domestic operations, as well as squeezing the 
hauliers’ profit margins. It may also have contributed to the increased rate of 
bankruptcies and insolvencies in the transport / communication sector between 1998 
and 2004 (Burns Inquiry, 2005). Many of the less competitive operators will have been 
forced to leave the industry. This would be in keeping with the government’s objective 
of ‘modernising the UK road haulage’ (HM Treasury, 2000) 
On the negative side, the British government loses large amounts of potential revenue 
that it could earn from foreign hauliers if they bought their fuel in the UK. We estimate 
that if foreign operators bought all the fuel required for their UK operations within the 
UK the government would gain around £200million more each year in fuel duty.  
There is legitimate concern too that, as foreign hauliers pay neither fuel duty nor 
vehicle excise duty in the UK, they contribute nothing to the construction, maintenance 
and policing of the UK road network nor do they cover any of the environmental costs 
they impose while travelling in the UK. Recent research undertaken by NERA (2005) 
for the Freight Transport Association has valued the environmental, accident-related 
and road track costs imposed in the UK by foreign trucks at £236 million per annum. 
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Possible ways of correcting the fuel duty anomaly 
 
As noted earlier, steep increases in the market price of fuel during a period of 
relatively stable duties has had the effect of narrowing differentials in pump prices. The 
gap between fuel tax levels in the UK and those of other EU countries remain wide, 
however. It has been argued, therefore, that government initiatives are required to 
reduce or possibly close this gap. These initiatives could be introduced at an EU level or 
internally within the UK. 
 
 
EU initiative 
In its 2001 Transport Policy White Paper, the European Commission (2001) proposed 
‘harmonisation of fuel taxation for commercial users, particularly in road transport’. It 
published a draft directive in 2002 to standardise excise duty for the commercial use of 
diesel in goods vehicles of over 16 tonnes gross weight by 2010 for the EU15 and 2012 
for the new accession states. Countries would have been allowed initially to vary their 
level of duty around a ‘central rate’ of 350 Euros per 1000 litres of fuel. The 
‘fluctuation band’ around the central value would narrow, however, with convergence 
on the harmonized rate by 2010 for the EU15. Annual indexation of the central rate 
would raise it to 410 Euros by 2010.  
 
The two main aims of this proposal were to: 
 
1. remove market distortions in the European road haulage industry and level the 
competitive ‘playing field’, at least as far as fuel purchases were concerned.  
 
2. recover a higher proportion of the environmental costs imposed by road freight 
transport. 
 
The Commission is, after all, committed to applying the ‘polluter pays’ principle in 
the transport sector3 (European Commission, 2001). Harmonising fuel duty at 410 Euro 
per 1000 litres would have increased the tax burden on hauliers in most EU15 countries 
and raised the total tax revenue from road freight operations across the continent. It 
would, however, have had the opposite effect in the UK, where, at the time the draft 
directive was published, fuel duty was already 80% higher. Harmonising on the 410 
Euro central value would have cost the UK Exchequer around £2bn in lost revenue 
(House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, 2003). It is hardly surprising 
therefore that the UK government strongly opposed the 2002 draft directive. At an EU 
level it was rejected by the European Parliament in November 2003. Undeterred by this 
earlier rejection, the European Commission has recently launched a new round of 
consultation on the issue of fuel tax harmonisation. It has identified three options: 
 
                                                 
3 For consistency the same principle should be applied to all sectors, though in recent years much of the 
debate about the internalization of environmental costs has focused on the transport sector. 
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Option A: No further intervention at an EU level, with individual states retaining 
freedom to set the level of fuel duty. 
 
Option B: Gradual harmonisation on a single EU fuel duty. It is proposed that this 
single duty level should be 400 Euro per 1000 litres of diesel fuel and universally 
adopted by 2018. 
 
Option C: Gradual convergence on a narrow range of fuel duty rates delimited by 
EU-wide maximum and minimum values. This range would be progressively 
reduced to 100 Euro by 2010.  
 
It remains to be seen if this new EU initiative will command greater support today 
than the previous attempt to harmonise fuel duties across the continent. 
 
 
UK initiatives 
 
UK fuel duties deviate much further from the EU mean than those of other countries 
and this deviation appears to have a greater impact on the competitive position of road 
hauliers in Britain than in other parts of the EU. It can be argued, therefore, that the UK 
presents a special case which requires country-specific initiatives. The Burns Inquiry 
(2005) identified a total of fifteen options (or ‘potential solutions’) which the British 
government could adopt to correct the fuel duty anomaly or at least ease its effects on 
the UK road haulage industry. These were assessed, on a subjective basis, against a set 
of eight criteria4. None of the options satisfied more than six of the eight criteria, with 
most of them unlikely to gain ‘political acceptability’. The options can be grouped into 
three categories: 
 
1. Reduce diesel fuel duty for all users 
2. Reduce the fuel duty paid by road hauliers 
3. Increase the fuel duty paid by foreign haulers operating in the UK 
 
 
1. Reduce diesel fuel duty for all users: 
This would be a relatively simple fiscal measure, but one which would sharply reduce 
government tax revenue and conflict with its energy conservation and sustainable 
distribution goals (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1999). 
Every 1 pence reduction in fuel duty would cut government tax revenue by £200 million 
(Burns Inquiry, 2005). Bringing the UK diesel fuel duty down to the EU average would 
require a 25 pence per litre reduction and represent a loss of £5.2 billion per annum in 
                                                 
4 These criteria were: (i) extent to which the scheme corrected the fuel duty anomaly (ii) ease of operation 
(iii) cost to government (iv) extent to which it made foreign carriers pay the true costs of operating on UK 
roads (v) acceptability to fuel suppliers (vi) speed of implementation (vii) ability to decouple truck 
taxation from that of cars (viii) political acceptability. 
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tax revenue. This would require a major restructuring of government finances. There is 
no evidence that the government is seriously contemplating this option. 
 
 
2. Reduce fuel duty paid by road hauliers: 
This option would involve decoupling the diesel fuel taxes paid by different road 
users. Road hauliers could then pay less fuel duty than diesel car users. This decoupling 
could be achieved in several ways: 
 
(i) differentiation of diesel fuel used in trucks: this could be done by placing a 
coloured dye in the fuel, as already happens in the case of ‘red’ diesel used, for 
example, in farm vehicles and refrigeration units. Currently red diesel carries a very 
low rate of duty (only 6.4 p per litre). As the reduced level of fuel duty for hauliers 
would be substantially higher than this, a different colour dye would have to be 
added (blue has been proposed). This option was suggested by the government in a 
consultation exercise in 2001 and commanded little support (HM Treasury, 2001). 
The current system of red diesel is widely infringed and the creation of another 
category of coloured fuel would further complicate the enforcement process. 
 
(ii) introduction of a rebating system: trade associations have argued that British 
road hauliers deserve an Essential User Rebate on fuel duty to compensate them for 
the fact that foreign carriers can avoid paying this duty (Road Haulage Association, 
2000). Such a ‘fuel duty rebate’ scheme has operated successfully for many years 
for buses in the UK. Several methods could be used to rebate a proportion of the 
fuel duty paid by hauliers. For example, hauliers could provide receipts to confirm 
fuel purchases or by using special fuel cards they could have the rebate deducted 
automatically from the price at the refuelling point.  
 
(iii) transfer a proportion of the fuel duty onto VAT: as road hauliers, unlike most 
diesel car users, are VAT-registered they would be able to reclaim the VAT, 
effectively gaining a fuel duty rebate. The Burns Inquiry investigated this option, 
however, and found that it would infringe current EU rules on VAT. 
 
This option would also cut government tax revenues, though by a smaller amount than 
the first option (£2 billion per annum as opposed to £5.2 billion). The government 
would be unlikely to countenance such a loss of revenue. It has, nevertheless, been 
argued by the Centre for Business Research (quoted in Burns Inquiry, 2005) that this 
loss would be largely offset by additional tax revenues raised mainly from three 
sources: 
 
• increase in the share of domestic and international road haulage undertaken by 
British-registered hauliers paying taxes to the UK government 
• UK hauliers, particularly those engaged on international operations and foreign 
carriers, switching the purchase of their fuel from other countries (including 
Eire) to the UK and thus paying UK duty 
• additional employment created in the UK as a result of the new tax policy 
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Several of the assumptions underpinning this analysis are rather tenuous. For 
example, it is assumed that aligning UK fuel duty with the EU mean would virtually 
eliminate cabotage. The government also disputes the claim that rebating fuel duty for 
hauliers in this way would be self-financing. 
 
 
3. Increase the taxes / charges paid by foreign hauliers 
 
Rather than levelling fuel duty for UK hauliers down to the EU mean, this option 
would impose British levels of fuel duty on foreign carriers operating in the UK. To 
comply with EU rules, this could only be done in a way that did not discriminate against 
foreign operators and / or present a barrier to trade. Two proposals considered by the 
Burns Inquiry would clearly fail this test. These are the suggestions all trucks must enter 
the UK with an empty fuel tank and / or leave the country with a full tank of fuel. 
The other means of achieving this option would entail the introduction of some form 
of road user charging for trucks. Truck tolling schemes have been introduced in 
Switzerland, Germany and Austria, partly to ensure that foreign-registered vehicles are 
adequately charged for their use of road infrastructure (McKinnon, 2006a). In its 2001 
consultation exercise the UK government sought views on the adoption of either a 
distance- or time-based system of road user charging in the UK (HM Treasury, 2001). 
The distance-based charging option received much more support than a time-based 
scheme employing vignettes (or ‘Britdisks’) (HM Treasury, 2002a). The UK 
government then embarked on the development of a Lorry Road User Charging (LRUC) 
scheme, which would have charged all lorries with a gross weight of over 3.5 tonnes a 
per-kilometre toll for using the UK road network. Hauliers, registered either in the UK 
or other countries, would have been able to reclaim a proportion of their fuel duty to 
offset against the road user charge. The government assured the British road haulage 
industry that its overall tax burden would not increase as a result of LRUC, at least in its 
early stages (HM Treasury, 2002b; HM Treasury, 2003). The fuel duty rebate system 
would ensure fiscal neutrality for UK operators. Foreign hauliers, on the other hand, 
would have to pay charges on an equivalent basis to their British counterparts for their 
use of UK road infrastructure.  
The government’s plans for LRUC were criticised for being over-specified, too 
expensive and poorly aligned with its declared policy objectives (House of Commons 
Transport Committee, 2005; McKinnon, 2006b). Although portrayed essentially as a 
means of ‘levelling the playing field’ between British and foreign operators, LRUC 
would also have had the capability to vary charges by road type, geographical area and 
time of day (HM Customs and Excise, 2004). An alternative, much simpler and cheaper 
system of road user charging for trucks has been proposed, which would rely on 
tachograph readings rather than vehicle tracking to measure the distance travelled by 
lorries on UK roads (McKinnon, 2006b). 
The government decided to abandon its plans for LRUC in July 2005, arguing that it 
would be more sensible to develop road user charging for trucks within the context of a 
more general programme of road pricing for all categories of vehicle. According to 
government reports, general road pricing is unlikely to be introduced before 2015 at the 
earliest (Department for Transport, 2004b). Representatives of the UK haulage industry 
have argued that the fuel duty anomaly needs to be corrected before then (Wright, 
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2006). A simpler, low technology scheme, involving distance measurement and fuel 
duty rebating, could be implemented on an interim basis until general road pricing is 
technically feasible and politically acceptable (McKinnon, 2006b). A joint government-
industry committee is currently re-examining the whole issue of fuel duty differentials, 
foreign competition and cabotage. 
Little progress has therefore been made towards correcting the fuel duty anomaly. As 
noted earlier, however, the upward trend in the market price of fuel, combined with 
stable duty levels, is gradually narrowing the gap between the UK and average EU 
diesel prices.  
The remainder of the paper considers the opportunities for addressing another issue 
which has been seriously concerning the British road haulage industry. This is the 
difficulty of recovering fuel price increases from shippers, particularly during periods of 
high fuel price inflation. 
 
 
Recovery of fuel price increases from shippers 
 
Across the EU15, diesel fuel prices rose by an average 36% between January 2004 
and March 2006 (European Commission, 2006a). In the UK, they rose by an average of 
23%, inflating average vehicle operating costs by roughly 6% (European Commission, 
2006a; Phillips, 2006). In an ideal world, these increases would be passed down the 
supply chain and ultimately borne by the final consumer. It is possible to make a rough 
estimate of the inflationary effect of such an eventuality. According to a quinquennial 
survey undertaken for the European Logistics Association (A.T.Kearney, 2004), in 2003 
the logistics costs of European businesses averaged 6.1% of sales revenue and transport 
accounted for 43% of these costs. If one assumes that fuel constitutes on average 27% 
of truck operating costs, the 36% increase in diesel fuel prices between January 2004 
and March 2006 would have added only around 25.5 cents to a 100 Euro shopping bill. 
If averaged over the typical family shopping budget such an increase would be barely 
noticed. 
The suggestion that fuel price increases should ripple down the supply chain, in much 
the way that VAT is added, may seem far-fetched. It was, however, another formal 
proposal in the Transport White Paper of the European Commission (2001). The 
Commission indicated that it would propose ‘legislation allowing harmonisation of 
certain clauses in contracts in order to protect carriers from consignors and enable them 
to revise their tariffs in the event of a sharp rise in fuel prices’ (p.16). In other words, it 
would become a legal requirement to build clauses into haulage contracts giving carriers 
the right to reclaim fuel price increases. It is difficult to see how such legislation could 
be enforced in an industry as intensely competitive as road haulage. Nor would this 
proposed legislation offer much support for the large section of the haulage industry 
relying mainly on spot-hire rather than longer term contracts. 
A survey conducted by Aleszewicz (2005) found that a sample of 29 hauliers 
managed to recover an average of only 27% of the fuel price increase over the previous 
year. Underlying this average, however, was a wide variation in the % of the price 
increase recovered. Twelve of the 29 claimed to have recovered less than 5%, while 
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nine were compensated for 50% or more of the fuel price increase. Only around a 
quarter of the companies responding (27%) indicated that shippers with whom they had 
contracts automatically compensated them if the fuel price rose above an agreed margin. 
Three out of four claimed that compensation for fuel price increases ‘always or usually’ 
involved negotiation.  
A larger survey conducted several months later for the Burns Inquiry (2005, p.36) 
found that around 60% of UK hauliers were ‘able to substantially recover fuel costs’ in 
2005. The ability to gain compensation for fuel price rises depended on the size of the 
operator, however. Only 50% of hauliers with five or fewer vehicles managed to 
‘substantially recover fuel costs’, while for operators with 26 or more vehicles the 
corresponding percentage was almost 80% (Table 4). Between 2000 and 2005, 
differences in the extent to which the three size classes of haulier were able to recover 
fuel price increases markedly widened. This will have strengthened the market position 
and profitability of the larger operators, particularly as this deviation coincided with 
sharp increases in fuel prices. 
 
Table 4: Percentage of hauliers able to ‘substantially recover’ fuel price rises from shippers. 
 1-5 trucks 6-25 trucks >26 trucks 
2000 43 40 43 
2001 39 43 48 
2002 35 45 50 
2003 34 48 58 
2004 45 50 85 
2005 53 77 79 
Source: Burns Inquiry (2005) 
 
The differing experiences of hauliers of varying size can be partly explained by the 
greater reliance of larger operators on contracts containing ‘fuel clauses’. Many logistics 
companies have open-book contracts which allow them to reclaim fuel price increases. 
The vast majority of hauliers, however, are small and lack this type of contractual 
relationship. For example, according to unpublished data from the Traffic 
Commissioner, the average road freight operator in the Scotland runs only four vehicles, 
while 79% of them have five our fewer vehicles.  
 
 
Improvement in fuel efficiency 
 
Fuel price increases give operators an incentive to improve the energy efficiency of 
their operations, particularly when they cannot be recouped in full by rate increases. A 
commonly held view among shippers is that hauliers should not be compensated in full 
for fuel price rises as this would remove the incentive to improve fuel efficiency. By 
raising the energy efficiency of their transport operations, hauliers are not only able to 
offer more competitive rates. They can also reduce their exposure to future fuel price 
increases.  
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Between 1990 and 2005, average fuel efficiency across the entire UK truck fleet 
increased by roughly 10.5%. Most of this increase occurred over two time periods, 1994 
-1998 and 2004-5 (Figure 8). These were periods of high fuel price inflation. The first 
coincided with the first four years of the government’s fuel duty escalator policy. In 
2004-5, the surge in fuel prices occurred as a result of the increase in the world price of 
oil. The close correlation between fuel efficiency and fuel price trends suggests that 
demand for fuel from the haulage industry is price-sensitive and that companies respond 
to sharp fuel price increases by running their vehicles more fuel efficiently, especially 
larger and heavier articulated lorries. 
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Figure 8: Average Fuel Efficiency of Different Classes of Truck in the UK. 
Source: Department for Transport (2006b). 
 
Fuel efficiency gains, however, cannot possibly offset price rises of the magnitude 
experienced over the past two years. Where hauliers are unable to recover fuel price 
increases in higher rates or achieve offsetting improvements in fuel efficiency, they 
have to absorb at least a proportion of the higher fuel costs within their profit margins. 
As average profit margins in the British road haulage industry are only around 3%, most 
hauliers can ill-afford to do this (Plimsoll, 2005). 
As it is predicted that fuel prices are likely to remain volatile and follow a longer-term 
upward trend, some method needs to be found to compensate hauliers for these 
inflationary pressures on one of the main inputs into their business.  
 
 
Methods of compensating hauliers for fuel price rises 
 
Road haulage is typically a buyer’s market. It is a sector characterised by over-supply 
of capacity and intense competition. This can make it easy for shippers to refuse to 
compensate hauliers for fuel price increases, particularly in the spot-hire, general 
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haulage market. If one haulier insists on getting a higher rate to cover higher fuel costs, 
another can usually be found that will undercut this rate. Where haulage work is 
undertaken on a contractual basis, however, it can be advantageous for a shipper to 
incorporate a fuel price clause into the contract. Where oil prices are relatively high, as 
at present, shippers risk accepting rates based on high fuel prices that may drop during 
the period of the contract. Also, during periods of rapidly increasing fuel prices, failure 
to compensate hauliers can risk driving them into bankruptcy and disrupting the 
transport operation. The Burns Inquiry (2005), for example, found that hauliers were 
able to recover a much higher proportion of fuel price increases during periods of high 
fuel price inflation (2004 – 2005) than over periods when fuel price rises were more 
modest (2001-2003) (Table 4).  
An ideal method of compensating hauliers for fuel price increases would adhere to 
four principles:  
 
• Visibility – both parties should have open access to fuel price and use data 
•  Equity - opportunistic behaviour by one party should be discouraged 
• Symmetry – as fuel prices can go down as well as up, adjustments should operate 
in both directions. 
• Sustainability – the arrangement should survive periods of high price volatility 
 
Four methods have been proposed (Aleszewicz , 2005) 
 
1. The shipper buys the fuel for the carrier. Safeguards must be put in place, 
however, to ensure that carriers do not abuse this situation. This can be done by 
giving them fuel efficiency targets.  
There are a few instances of this happening in practice, though it is relatively 
uncommon. When companies outsource their transport operations, they prefer to 
entrust fuel purchasing to their carriers. 
 
2. The shipper and carrier agree an open-book contract establishing full 
transparency of fuel consumption, expenditure and price levels. The contract sets 
out the fuel price compensation rules, preferably incorporating fuel efficiency 
targets. This tends only to work, however, in the case of dedicated contracts 
where shippers have the exclusive use of vehicle assets. It is more difficult to 
apply to groupage / network services where several shippers’ traffic is 
consolidated in the same vehicle. 
 
3. The shipper tries independently to determine an adequate level of fuel price 
compensation. To do this, he requires information about changes in the fuel 
price and the % of the contract value which is spent on fuel. The first figure 
should be quite easy to find. This latter, however, is much harder to estimate. 
Annual surveys of road haulage costs, such as those compiled in the UK by 
Motor Transport, DFF and the Freight Transport Association, give an indication 
of the proportion of total costs allocated to fuel, but their estimates vary. The 
haulage work undertaken for a particular shipper can also differ significantly 
from the industry averages used in these published cost tables. In the case of 
cross-border operations, the situation is even more complicated as the % of 
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operating costs spent on fuel and fuel price increases vary from country to 
country, as discussed earlier. 
 
4. At the time of tendering the carrier specifies the percentage of the contract value 
to be spent on fuel and agrees with the shipper that fuel price increases, above a 
certain margin, will automatically trigger additional payments in proportion to 
the declared expenditure on fuel. This allows the shipper to take the fuel cost % 
into account during the tendering process. The main problem with this method is 
that many carriers would have difficulty estimating the fuel cost component in a 
tender, particularly for a complex mix of loads and routes. Aleszewicz (2005) 
found that almost a third of hauliers seldom or never disaggregated fuel costs by 
shipper and journey. Many hauliers might also be reluctant to accept the risk 
involved in fixing the fuel costs incorporated within a contract at the time of 
tendering. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In its mid-term review of its 2001 Transport White Paper, the European Commission 
(2006) acknowledges that ‘the predominance of small companies and the impact on 
competition of considerable differences in fuel tax levels between Member States are 
important factors that will influence future development’ (p.9). Despite the 
Commission’s earlier efforts to narrow variations in fuel duty across the EU, they 
remain quite wide, with the British duty level 24% above the mean for the EU15. The 
development of the British road haulage industry over the past decade illustrates what 
can happen when a government unilaterally imposes a high fuel duty policy within a 
liberalised international freight market. This policy has undoubtedly contributed to the 
sharp increase in the level of cabotage in the UK since 1998, when this practice was 
fully deregulated within the EU15. Foreign-registered hauliers buying all their fuel 
before entering the UK gain a significant cost advantage over domestic hauliers and 
avoid contributing to the cost of building, maintaining and policing the country’s road 
infrastructure. This fuel cost advantage, however, is only one of several factors that 
have reinforced the growth of cabotage. It is also important to put cabotage into 
perspective. By 2004, cabotage had captured only around 1.2% of domestic road tonne-
kms in the UK, in line with the EU25 average. Spatial analysis of cabotage penetration 
in the UK nevertheless reveals that its impact on the domestic haulage market is much 
greater, in some cases twenty times greater, on particular inter-regional routes. 
Increases in the market price of fuel during a period when fuel duties have remained 
reasonably stable are narrowing international variations in pump prices. This is reducing 
the relative cost advantage that foreign operators gain from ‘fuelling-up’ outside the 
UK. It is, however, exacerbating another problem for British, and other European, 
hauliers – that of recovering fuel price increases from shippers. The extent to which 
they are able to recover these price increases and protect their margins varies with the 
size of carrier, the nature of the business and industrial sector. The steep rise in the oil 
price over the past two years has strengthened the need for more fair and consistent 
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methods of compensating hauliers for higher fuel costs. This paper has identified four 
possible methods. While none of them are ideal, they at least put the issue of fuel cost 
recovery on a more formal basis and offer a more practical solution to the problem than 
the European Commission’s proposal that legislation be used for this purpose. 
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